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Measuring skill in more-person games with
applications to poker
Ruud Hendrickx1,2 Peter Borm1 Ben van der Genugten1
Pim Hilbers1
Abstract
In several jurisdictions, commercially exploiting a game of chance
(rather than skill) is subject to a licensing regime. It is obvious that
roulette is a game of chance and chess a game of skill, but the law does
not provide a precise description of where the boundary between the two
classes is drawn. We build upon the framework of Borm and Van der
Genugten (2001) and Dreef et al. (2004) and propose a modification of
the skill concept for more-person games. We apply our new skill measure
to a simplified version of poker called Straight Poker and conclude that
this game should be classified as a game of skill.
Key words: games of chance, games of skill, poker
JEL classification number: C72
1 Introduction
In many countries, commercially exploiting games is subject to legal restrictions.
Usually, the law makes a distinction between games of skill and games of chance.
Whereas in most jurisdictions one is free to organise a chess tournament, starting
a casino offering games like roulette is subject to regulation. For many games,
however, it is not immediately clear to which class they belong and the way a
game of chance is defined by the law only provides a partial answer.
The motivation for this research comes from the Dutch Gaming Act (1964),
which states in Article 1 that
[. . . ] it is not allowed to: exploit games with monetary prizes if the
participants in general do not have a predominant influence on the
winning possibilities, unless in compliance to this act, a licence is
granted [. . . ].
1CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University.
2Corresponding author: PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. E-mail:
ruud@uvt.nl.
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To fix terminology, a game of chance is defined as a game satisfying the condition
of this Act and a game of skill is any other game. In this paper, we restrict
our attention to the Dutch situation, although in several other jurisdictions a
similar definition of a game of chance is used and our analysis can be applied
there without modification.
In a game of chance, the players do not, by definition, have a predominant
influence on the winning probabilities. Hence the need arises for a quantitative
assessment of the skill involved in playing a particular game. Borm and Van der
Genugten (2001) present a model measuring the skill of a strategic game, ie,
a game in which the outcome is determined by the players’ strategy choices
and not, eg, on their physical abilities or encyclopedic knowledge. The game’s
outcome however can also be influenced by external chance elements. In the
basic framework the probabilities involved are assumed to be known (think of
drawing cards from a deck), although using statistical techniques, the model
can be extended to incorporate estimated probabilities, as is done in Van der
Genugten et al. (2004).
The skill measure by Borm and Van der Genugten (2001) measures the
relative skill of a strategic game on a scale from 0, which corresponds to a game
of chance, to 1, which corresponds to a game of skill. The underlying idea is
that in a strategic game, a player’s payoff is determined on the one hand by
how skillfully he plays and on the other hand by random factors. The relative
weight of these effects determines the game’s skill. Dreef et al. (2003) studies
the relative skill measure of the simple two-player poker game with alternate
bidding of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).
Dreef et al. (2004) modified the skill measure introduced in Borm and
Van der Genugten (2001) in order to capture the effect of internal random moves
stemming from players’ behavioral choices. In the current paper we propose a
further modification with the aim of reducing computational complexity, which
allows us to analyse more elaborate and realistic more-person games like poker.
This new setting, which boils down to keeping the strategies of a player’s op-
ponents fixed throughout the analysis, has the further advantage of being more
natural and transparent than the more complex behaviour of the opponents as
modelled in the original setting. It is important to note however that for one-
player games, the modifications have no effect on the skill level. In section 2
we present and discuss the new relative skill measure. An extensive overview of
skill measures and related literature can be found in Dreef (2005).
Because the number of strategies in a typical poker game is huge, special
techniques are needed to cut down on both memory usage and computing time.
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In section 3 we illustrate and discuss several computational aspects of a game’s
relative skill level in general. In section 4 we apply the relative skill measure to
a stylised version of poker called Straight Poker. The results indicate that the
relative skill level of Straight Poker lies substantially above the 0.2 threshold,
which legal precedence suggests marks the boundary between games of chance
and games of skill.
2 Skill in games
The Gaming Act makes a distinction between a player’s actions as a determinant
of his winning possibilities (measured in terms of monetary gain) and extraneous
factors. We call the effect of a player’s strategy the learning effect and the effect
of the extraneous (chance) elements the random effect. To quantify these effects,
we define three player types. A beginner is a player who has just mastered the
rules of the game and is endowed with a particular (typically naive) strategy,
that possibly involves randomisation (a mixed strategy). An optimal player is a
player who completely mastered the rules of the game and picks a strategy that
maximises his expected gains. A fictive player is a player who chooses a gain-
maximising strategy, whilst knowing in advance the realisations of all random
moves. We discuss the exact extent of this knowledge of random moves in more
detail towards the end of this section.
For each of the three player types, the player’s strategy may depend on his
position or role in the game. In a poker game, players behave differently in the
first position at the table than they do at the last position. The strategy of a
player typically depends on which position at the table he occupies.
In a one-player game, like roulette or blackjack1, the expected gain of a
player in each role is completely determined by the definitions above. For a
beginner, you simply compute the expected gain of his endowed strategy, while
for the optimal and fictive player, you solve a constrained optimisation problem
to determine their optimal behaviour. In a game with more players, however, a
player’s gain is ambiguous, because you should specify against which (strategy
of the) opponents the gain should be computed.
Borm and Van der Genugten (2001) assume all opponents of a player i to
jointly play a strategy which is minimax in the associated two-player zero-sum
game in which they form a coalition against player i. Dreef et al. (2004) assume
all opponents of player i to form a coalition and play a joint best response against
1Both roulette and blackjack are of course played with more players, but a particular
player’s gain does not depend on the other players’ strategy choices. So, from a strategic
point of view, these games can be viewed as a series of parallel one-player games.
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player i’s strategy. Contrary to this, we instead make the assumption that all
opponents are beginners, each endowed with a predetermined strategy. We have
three reasons for this. First of all, beginners form a natural benchmark. The
learning effect is supposed to measure the effect of mastering all the strategic
intricacies of the game and the most natural way to measure this is to keep
al other things (ie, the opponents’ strategies) constant. Second, the minimax
strategy of the opposing coalition as needed in the original approach need not
be unique, leading to indeterminacy of the skill level. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, with multiple players game trees are large even in the most basic
variant of poker, so calculating mutual best responses becomes impossible and
assuming a fixed beginner’s strategy for each opponent is a necessity from a
computational perspective.
We denote the finite set of roles by R and the gain of the beginner, optimal




r , respectively. In our
analysis of poker, we take the gain to be the player’s expected payoff.
The learning effect in role r ∈ R is defined as the difference in gain between






and the random effect is defined as the difference between the gain of the fictive






It follows from the definitions of the player types that both effects are always
non-negative.












If the learning effect is not predominant, ie, small compared to the ran-
dom effect, the game is deemed a game of chance. This leads to the following





A skill level of 0 indicates a pure game of chance in the sense that the beginner
and the optimal player have the same gain. A skill level of 1 indicates a pure
game of skill, because apparently the fictive player cannot obtain additional
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gains compared to the optimal player using the extra information he has about
the chance moves. In particular, the latter occurs in games that possess no
chance elements (like chess).
Dreef et al. (2004) argue, contrary to Borm and Van der Genugten (2001),
that the fictive player should be endowed with knowledge of the realisations of
internal chance moves (an opponent randomising between various pure strate-
gies) as well as external chance moves (eg, the dealing of cards). We elaborate on
this assumption within our new framework in which all opponents are assumed
to be beginners.
Consider the well-known game of stone-paper-scissors. Two players simul-
taneously choose either stone, paper or scissors by means of a gesture. A player
choosing stone beats his opponent if he chooses scissors, scissors beats paper
and paper beats stone. If both players choose the same, the game ends in a
tie. Because of the cyclical winning condition, there is no a priori distinction
between the three pure strategies. As a result, it seems reasonable to take the
strategy in which stone, paper and scissors are all played with probability 1
3
as
the beginner’s strategy. The optimal player can not play this game any better
than the beginner, both having an expected gain of 0.
Because this game has no external chance moves, the fictive player as mod-
elled in Borm and Van der Genugten (2001) also arrives at the same result.
Consequently, LE = RE = 0 and the relative skill level is undetermined. In-
tuitively, however, one would say that stone-paper-scissors is a pure game of
chance. The way to incorporate this intuition into the model is to fully capture
all chance elements in the definition of the fictive player by assuming that he
also knows beforehand the realisations of the opponents’ internal chance moves.
In stone-paper-scissors, this would lead to a positive expected gain for the fic-
tive player (indeed, he will win every single game), leading to a positive random
effect and a relative skill level of 0.
To give an impression of the magnitude of S, the table below provides an
overview of the relative skill level of various one-player games (cf Dreef (2005)).






A recent case with far-reaching consequences involved Grand Prix Manager
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2003 (GPM 2003). This is a so-called management game, in which a participant
acts as the manager of a fictive sports team. The goal is to assemble a motor
racing team (in terms of car components and personnel) that performs well in
a simulated season of Formula One motor racing. Note that a management
game is not a strategic game, since the probabilities involved in the external
chance moves are not explicitly known to the players. As argued in Van der
Genugten et al. (2004), however, because the game has many participants and
many rounds, one can use statistical techniques to analyse the skill level of such
a management game as if it were a strategic game.
Two of the current authors were expert witnesses in the GPM 2003 case.
Van der Genugten et al. (2004) determined the relative skill level of various
variants of GPM 2003, depending on the exact prize scheme. Using a gradual
scheme (ie, one in which the prizes are not restricted to only the top few players
in the final ranking), the relative skill level of GPM 2003 equals approximately
0.3. Comparing this with earlier verdicts on games that were judged to be games
of chance, it was argued that a reasonable threshold above which a game should
be considered a game of skill would be 0.2. Arnhem District Court accepted the
report in full (2 February 2005, nr.105364), thereby setting a legal precedent for
our skill level threshold estimate of 0.2.
3 Computing gains
As discussed in the previous section, in order to compute the skill measure of
a game, you have to determine the (expected) gains of a beginner, an optimal
player and a fictive player, all playing against beginners. In this section we
discuss some related computational aspects.
For the beginner, the computations are straightforward. In each role, the
beginner is endowed with a predetermined strategy, possibly mixed. Note that
in the context of poker, a player’s pure strategy is a function that assigns an
action to each information set and can hence depend on that player’s private
information (in particular, the cards he holds). So for each realisation of the
external chance moves, we know all the probabilities on the actions in the game
tree, as well as the gain in each leaf.
For expositional purposes we do not analyse a poker game in this section,
but rather a simpler fictional game which is sufficiently general and in which the
calculations can be illustrated more clearly. The only external chance element
in this two-player zero-sum game is that player 2 receives either hand A or hand
B, each occurring with probability 1
2
. We illustrate the calculations for each of
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the three player types in the role of player 1. There is no variation in the hand
of player 1 throughout this section: for a player of any type, to compute the
expected gain in a game where he can hold one of several hands, you perform
the calculations for each hand he might hold separately, conditioning all payoffs
and probabilities on the event that he receives this hand, and then take the
average, weighted with the probabilities of each hand occurring.
In case player 1 is a beginner, he bases his strategy, by assumption of naive
play, only on his own hand and not on the hand player 2 holds. In case he is a
fictive player, he knows which hand player 2 holds. In both cases, to compute
the expected gain, you can perform the calculations for each of the opponent’s
hands separately and then take the average. So for our purposes it suffices to
illustrate the analysis for the beginner and fictive player only in case player 2
holds hand A. The optimal player 1 does not know which hand player 2 holds,
but by inference he possesses some partial information which he should use to
determine a best response. As a consequence, we have to perform the analysis
for both hands simultaneously to obtain the proper conditional probabilities.
In Figure 1 we depict the game tree, where in each node there is a choice
between action left (L) and right (R). The beginners’ mixed strategies are
indicated by the probabilities on the arcs and the italic numbers represent the
gains of player 1 (equalling the losses of player 2) on the leaves. Player 2’s
strategy and the gains are both conditional on player 2 holding hand A. The
random moves in the various nodes are assumed to be independent and the
probabilities depicted in the tree are all conditional on the corresponding choice
node being reached.
In Table 1 we give an overview of all the probabilities on the leaves and
the corresponding contributions to the expected gain of player 1. The total
expected gain of player 1 if his opponent holds hand A equals 8 43
120
.
Leaf 5 6 8 9 12 13 15 16 20 21 23 24 27 28 30 31 total




























































Table 1: Probabilities of the leaves and expected gain (beginner vs beginner)
If player 1 is a fictive player, we have to compute for each realisation of
the internal chance moves of player 2 (still a beginner holding hand A) a best
response. In our stylised game we have to perform these calculations only twice,
once for each possible hand of the opponent. In a real poker game, however,
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Figure 1: Beginner (1) versus beginner (2) with hand A
the number of possible realisations of the external chance moves over which
the average should subsequently be taken is typically very large. As we argue
in the next section, that number can be reduced without too much loss of
accuracy by considering a small number of equivalence classes (categories). For
the internal chance moves, however, there is no such obvious a priori reduction.
Instead, we speed up calculations by observing that the gain at each leaf only
depends on the external chance moves. Knowing the realisations of the internal
chance moves, the fictive player knows which leaves he can reach by choosing
the appropriate actions. For each realisation, he chooses a strategy which gives
him the highest gain. The crucial point now is that some leaves are picked
for multiple realisations. The leaf with the highest gain for the fictive player is
chosen whenever the realisations of the opponents’ choices allow it to be reached,
the leaf with the second-highest gain is chosen if it is reachable and the leaf with
the highest gain is not, and so on.
So, for each realisation of the external chance moves, in our case player 2
holding hand A, we recursively determine the leaf with the highest gain for
the fictive player, compute the probability of it being made reachable by the
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internal chance moves of the opponents, conditional on the event that no leaf of
a previous iteration is chosen, and compute the corresponding contribution to
the expected gain of the fictive player. This recursion continues until all leaves
that are chosen with positive probability have been dealt with.
In Figure 2 we have drawn the game tree again, where the probabilities of
player 2’s fixed strategy given hand A are shown on the arcs and the gains of
the fictive player 1 again are shown at the leaves.
b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b
1
2 17
3 10 18 25
4 7 11 14 19 22 26 29
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Figure 2: Fictive player (1) versus beginner (2) with hand A
By “(n : L)” with n a decision node for player 2, we denote the event that
at n, L is chosen and by “(n : R)” the event that R is chosen. By “(6= n)”
with n a leaf, we denote the event that player 2’s choices are such that n is not
reachable.
Node 31 has the highest gain for player 1 among all leaves that are reachable
with a positive probability (Step 0 in Table 2). If the beginner plays R at 17
and R at 29, then node 31 can be reached. The probability that the beginner
plays such that 31 can be reached then equals





If node 31 can be reached, the fictive player will always select it, regardless of
what other nodes can be reached, because no other node offers a higher payoff.
Thus we know that in 4/15 of all possible realisations of the internal chance
moves, the fictive player will be able to select node 31 and that, by assumption
of him playing a best response given his fictive information, he will do so.
Next we determine what happens if node 31 is not reachable. This event,





proceed by conditioning all probabilities in the game tree on this event. Nodes 17
and 29 are the only choices affected by this conditioning, which in turn affect
the conditional probabilities of leaves 20–31. For node 29 we have
P ((29 : R) | (6= 31)) =
P ((29 : R) ∩ ((17 : R) ∩ (29 : R))c)
P (((17 : R) ∩ (29 : R))c)
=
P ((29 : R) ∩ (29 : R)c)
P ((29 : R)c)
= 0,
where the second equality follows from (29 : R) ⊂ (17 : R). Similarly, P ((29 :
L) | (6= 31)) = 1.
At node 17, we have
P ((17 : R) | (6= 31)) =
P ((17 : R) ∩ ((17 : R) ∩ (29 : R))c)
P (((17 : R) ∩ (29 : R))c)
=
P ((17 : R) ∩ (29 : R)c)
P (((17 : R) ∩ (29 : R))c)
=
P ((17 : R))P ((29 : L) | (17 : R))














Given the new conditional probabilities on the edges, we next compute for
each leaf the probabilities of it being reachable, conditional on (6= 31). The
results are in Table 2 (Step 1).
Because node 16 has the highest gain among the leaves that can be reached
with positive probability conditional on (6= 31), the fictive player will select that
node. The probability of this given that node 31 is not reachable is 5/12. So
the absolute probability that the fictive player selects node 16 equals P (16|(6=
31)) ∗ P ((6= 31)) = 5/12 ∗ 11/15 = 11/36. Next, we condition the probabilities
on the event (6= 16) similarly as in the first step, only now for nodes 2 and 14
instead of 17 and 29. This yields the probabilities conditional on (6= 31)∪(6= 16)
presented in Table 2 (Step 2).
We continue with this procedure until all the (absolute) probabilities of the
10
Leaf 5 6 8 9 12 13 15 16 20 21 23 24 27 28 30 31





























































































Table 2: Conditional probabilities of the leaves
leaves chosen by player 1 add up to 1. In this instance, this occurs in 7 steps,
which are summarised in Table 3.
Step leaf picked gain prob. exp. gain






























Table 3: Overview of procedure to determine the fictive player’s gain
The expected gain for a fictive player 1 in case his opponent holds hand A
is finally computed by taking the weighted average of the gains at the seven
chosen leaves, yielding 13 161
360
.
A more straightforward way of determining the fictive player’s gain would
have been to enumerate all realisations of the internal chance moves and for each
realisation determine the gain by backward induction. But our approach speeds
things up considerably by enumerating only the fictive player’s best responses
and conditioning the corresponding probabilities accordingly. Moreover, we are
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only interested in his expected gain anyway and not in the actual corresponding
strategy profile.
Next, consider the case in which player 1 is an optimal player. In order
to determine his best response given his private information (cards), we apply
backward induction. The external chance moves and internal chance moves de-
termine a probability distribution on all the opponents’ actions in the game tree.
As a result, for each node of the optimal player that can thus be reached with
positive probability, we can compute for each realisation of the external chance
move the conditional probability of it having occurred and hence, the condi-
tional distribution of payoffs at the leaves. In our stylised game we therefore
cannot show the analysis only for player 2 holding hand A separately, but in
order to capture the conditioning properly we have to perform the calculations
for both hands of player 2 simultaneously. Starting at the final nodes of the
optimal player 1, we determine the action with the highest expected payoff and
from there on work our way back through the game tree.
To illustrate the computations for the optimal player 1, we can again consider
Figure 2 in case player 2 holds hand A and Figure 3 in case player 2 holds
hand B. Note that both player 2’s strategy and the payoffs at the leaves depend
on player 2’s hand.
To determine the optimal player’s best response, we first determine what he
should do in nodes 3, 10, 18 and 25. Denote by A the event that player 2 holds
hand A and by B the event that he holds B. Then, in node 3 the conditional
probability that the optimal player assigns to A equals, using Bayes’ law,
P (A | (2 : L)) =
P ((2 : L) |A)P (A)


















Similarly, you can compute all conditional probabilities on both hands in all
four aforementioned nodes. With these probabilities, player 1 can determine in





























In Table 4 we summarise player 1’s decisions in nodes 3, 10, 18 and 25.
Next, we determine what an optimal player 1 should do in node 1. Since in
node 1, he does not have any additional information regarding his opponent’s
hand, the conditional probability of hand A in node 1 simply equals the a priori
12
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Figure 3: Optimal player (1) versus beginner (2) with hand B

































Choice R R L R
Table 4: Optimal player’s choices
probability of 1
2
. Using this, and taking into account the choices presented in








































































so player 1 will choose R in node 1 with an expected gain of 10 9
20
.
4 Skill in Straight Poker
In Straight Poker, each player is dealt a 5-card hand from a standard deck of 52
after everyone has put a predetermined ante in the pot. The players then decide
in turn whether to pass (at no cost) or bet (costing a predetermined bet size),
until everyone has passed or one player has bet. If all players pass, everyone gets
his ante back and the payoff is zero. If some player bets, then all other players
(including the ones who passed before) in turn get the choice to fold, call or raise.
If a player folds, he is no longer in play and loses his ante. If a player calls,
he has to match the amount of money put in the pot by the previous player
who did not fold. If a player raises, he matches the amount by the previous
non-folded player and puts in an extra bet size. The number of raises that can
be made is bounded by a predetermined maximum. Of course, once this ceiling
has been reached, the remaining players can only choose between fold and call.
When all players have either folded or called, the non-folded players show their
hands and the player with the highest-ranking hand2 wins the pot. The pot is
split in case more than one player has the highest-ranking hand. In one variant,
the casino always takes a fixed percentage of the pot, called the rake.
In order to determine the relative skill level of Straight Poker, we have to
compute the strategies of the optimal player and the fictive player against a
beginner. The problem is that the strategy spaces of the players is this game
are huge. Depending on the exact specification of the rules, the game tree can
have many nodes. Moreover, since a player’s strategy is a function of the cards
he holds, we should perform calculations for any possible card combination.
In order to reduce the latter source of complexity, we partition the set of
poker hands into equivalence classes, called categories. Following, eg, Billings
et al. (2003), it seems reasonable to assume that a player takes the same action
when he holds, eg, ♣9♦9732 as when he holds ♠94♥976. For simplicity, we
impose the same partition into categories for all three player types, although we
will only use a coarsening to describe the beginner’s strategy. An overview of
the categories is given in Table 5, where we list the best hand in each category.
2For an overview of the ranking of poker hands, see, eg, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Hand_rankings.
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In the first 32 categories, the five cards are unsuited (ie, not all of the same
suit). Any hand stronger than two pairs (including a flush) is contained in
category 33.
In order to describe a reasonable beginner’s strategy for Straight Poker, we
start with two assumptions. First, a beginner will make a decision on whether
to pass or bet or whether to fold, call or raise only on the basis of the cards
he holds and not on the role he occupies. Second, a beginner will not use a
bluffing strategy: he will bet with stronger hands and pass with weaker hands.
Likewise, he will raise with strong hands, call with intermediate hands and fold
with weak hands. So, to fully describe a beginner’s strategy, we only have to
specify three boundaries.
In our analysis, we consider two different beginner’s strategies, which we
present in Table 6. For each boundary we indicate the highest category in
which the “lower” action is chosen. So, in both strategies a beginner bets with
a pair or better and raises with a pair of jacks or better. In strategy 1, the
beginner folds whenever he has no pair and in strategy 2, he folds whenever he
has less than ace-jack high.
Note that both beginner’s strategies are pure. In a subsequent sensitivity
analysis, however, we also consider mixed strategies.
To get an impression about which variables are important for the relative
skill level, we first analyse two-player Straight Poker, before proceeding to the
more computationally intensive variants with more players. The ante is set to 1
and there is no rake. For both cases of the beginner’s strategy we computed the
relative skill level for bet sizes 2, 4 and 8 and a maximum number of allowed
raises of 1, 2 and 3. In practical poker variants, a bet size of 2 or 4 and a
maximum of 3 raises is common. The results, which are taken from Hilbers
(2007), are presented in Table 7.
From the results in Table 7 we conclude that even in the most simple variant
of Straight Poker, the relative skill level lies above the critical threshold value
of 0.2 discussed in section 2. The relative skill level is increasing in the bet size,
whereas the maximum number of raises and the particular beginner’s strategy
against which all gains are computed do not seem to be very influential.
The positive influence of the bet size on the relative skill level can be un-
derstood as follows. Compare a game with bet size 2 to a game with bet size
8, all other things being equal. The strategy of the fictive player will be the
same in both games, since it only depends on the ordering of the leaves in terms
of gains, not on the actual numbers involved. This implies that each time the
beginner places a bet, the difference in the fictive player’s (non-negative) gain is
15
Cat. card 1 card 2 card 3 card 4 card 5 hands
1 9 8 7 6 4 53,040
2 10 9 8 7 5 70,380
3 J 9 8 7 6 71,400
4 J 10 9 8 6 56,100
5 Q 9 8 7 6 71,400
6 Q 10 9 8 7 57,120
7 Q J 10 9 7 84,660
8 K 9 8 7 6 71,400
9 K 10 9 8 7 57,120
10 K J 10 9 8 85,680
11 K Q J 10 8 121,380
12 A 9 8 7 6 70,380
13 A 10 9 8 7 57,120
14 A J 10 9 8 85,680
15 A Q J 10 9 122,400
16 A K 10 9 8 85,680
17 A K Q J 9 81,600
18 2 2 A K Q 84,480
19 3 3 A K Q 84,480
20 4 4 A K Q 84,480
21 5 5 A K Q 84,480
22 6 6 A K Q 84,480
23 7 7 A K Q 84,480
24 8 8 A K Q 84,480
25 9 9 A K Q 84,480
26 10 10 A K Q 84,480
27 J J A K Q 84,480
28 Q Q A K J 84,480
29 K K A Q J 84,480
30 A A K Q J 84,480
31 10 10 9 9 A 57,024
32 A A K K Q 66,528
33 all hands better than 2 pairs 74,628
total 2,598,960
Table 5: Categories of poker hands (best hand in each category displayed)
a factor 4. The optimal player on the other hand bases his strategy on expected
gain and different bet sizes may lead to different best responses. For hands with
16
Strategy pass/bet fold/call call/raise
1 17 17 26
2 17 13 26
Table 6: Beginner’s strategies in Straight Poker
Beg. bet allowed rel. beg. bet allowed rel.
strat. size raises skill strat. size raises skill
1 2 1 0.35 2 2 1 0.34
1 2 2 0.35 2 2 2 0.35
1 2 3 0.36 2 2 3 0.35
1 4 1 0.40 2 4 1 0.40
1 4 2 0.39 2 4 2 0.40
1 4 3 0.40 2 4 3 0.41
1 8 1 0.45 2 8 1 0.46
1 8 2 0.43 2 8 2 0.45
1 8 3 0.44 2 8 3 0.46
Table 7: Skill of 2-player Straight Poker
a positive expected gain, he is confronted with the same difference in expected
gain as the fictive player, but for hands with a negative expected gain, his losses
will be equal. So, on average the optimal player will be better off.
To measure the sensitivity of the relative skill level with respect to the be-
ginner’s strategy, we consider some slight alterations of the boundaries listed in
Table 6. For the call/raise boundary of 26 (a pair of jacks) we performed the
calculations for the alternatives 25 (a pair of tens) and 27 (a pair of queens) and
the two intermediate cases in which with a pair of tens (or jacks, respectively)
the beginner calls and raises with probability 1
2
(and, of course, raises in each
higher category and calls or folds in each lower category). For the boundary of
13 (ace-jack high) we computed the seven variants in between a 50-50 choice in
category 12 (ace-nine high) and a 50-50 choice in category 15 (ace-queen high).
For the boundary of 17 (a pair of twos), we computed the seven alternatives in
between a 50-50 choice with 16 (ace-king high) and a 50-50 choice with 19 (a
pair of threes).
We computed the relative skill level for each combination of boundaries,
bet sizes and maximum number of raises. The histograms of the results for
beginner’s strategies 1 and 2 are presented in Figure 4 and 5, respectively.
We observe that the variation in skill level is quite large. In all variants,
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Figure 4: Relative skill histogram measured against variations of beginner’s
strategy 1





















Figure 5: Relative skill histogram measured against variations of beginner’s
strategy 2
however, the skill level lies above the 0.2 threshold.
Above, we argued that the bet size is an important determining factor for
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the relative skill level. If you take a closer look at the results, this finding is
confirmed when one considers the variations in the beginner’s strategy. Indeed,
if you take only one particular bet size, the variation in relative skill level is
far less pronounced. In Figure 6 we depict the histogram for the variants of
strategy 1 and bet size equal to 4 (and 1, 2 or 3 raises allowed).























Figure 6: Relative skill histogram measured against variations of beginner’s
strategy 1, with bet size 4
The results for bet size 2 and bet size 8 are similar to Figure 6, with similar
spread, and peaks at approximately 0.33 and 0.42, respectively. For each bet
size, the low observations correspond to a beginner’s strategy with a relatively
high fold/call boundary. This confirms the earlier finding that relative skill is
lower when measured against a more conservative beginner’s strategy.
If we add a rake of 5% of the pot, there are two effects. The main effect is
that the fictive player is far more exposed to the rake, which in effect is paid by
the winner, than the optimal player. This would suggest an increase in skill if
a rake is introduced. A second effect is that the expected gain of the beginner
changes. His expected payoff will decrease, but the effect may be asymmetric
in the player roles, so the net effect on the relative skill level is unclear. Using a
subsample of all variants of the beginner’s strategy discussed before, we observe
that in nearly all instances, the net effect of a 5% rake on relative skill will be
positive (although in some variants, it is slightly negative), with an increase of
19
up to 0.05.
From the above we conclude that the relative skill of 2-player Straight Poker
hovers between 0.25 and 0.45, depending on the specific rules (a higher bet
size leading to a more skillful game). The relative skill level depends on the
beginner’s strategy against which it is measured, but in no variant does it drop
below the 0.2 threshold. In almost all variants, a rake of 5% leads to an increase
in relative skill.
When we consider Straight Poker with more than two players, both memory
usage and computing time increase quickly. Both the tree size and the number
of category combinations that have to be evaluated increase exponentially in the
number of players. Since the tree size is determined by the rules of the game,
we can only speed things up by reducing the number of categories. We consider
the coarsening of the original 33 categories in Table 5 into the 9 categories
indicated by the horizontal lines. Note that this particular coarsening allows for
the beginner’s strategies mentioned in Table 6 to be expressed in terms of the
new categories.
Since we are interested foremost in whether the relative skill level lies above
the 0.2 threshold, we further save time by only performing the calculations for
those worst-case variants which led to the lowest 10% in skill level in the 2-player
case. So we implicitly take the view that the number of players has a negligible
effect on which values of the other parameters lead to a minimum relative skill
level. The results for three and four players are presented in Figures 7 and 8,
respectively. These results provide an indication that with more players, the
relative skill level of Straight Poker will be higher.
The conclusion is that Straight Poker, which is a rather stylised variant of
fixed-limit poker, is a game of skill. Note that in no-limit poker or poker in
tournament form, betting decisions are typically of a different kind, requiring a
separate but similar analysis.
In poker variants that are more realistic than Straight Poker, like Texas
Hold’em and 7-Card Stud, there are usually two additional sources of complex-
ity: typically, there are many betting rounds and each player’s final (five-card)
hand is composed in a more elaborate way. In a game with more moves there
is more scope for the optimal player to obtain information by inference which
the fictive player gets for free. So in a more complicated game the information
gap between the optimal and fictive player closes and the random effect has a
relatively smaller impact. One would therefore expect that the more complex
the game tree becomes, the higher the relative skill level will be.
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Figure 7: Relative skill, 3 players





















Figure 8: Relative skill, 4 players
21
References
Billings, D., N. Burch, A. Davidson, R. Holte, J. Schaeffer, T. Schauenberg,
and D. Szafron (2003). Approximating game-theoretic optimal strategies
for full-scale poker. In: Proceedings of IJCAI-03.
Borm, P. and B. van der Genugten (2001). On a relative measure of skill for
games with chance elements. TOP , 9, 91–114.
Dreef, M. (2005). Skill and strategy in games. Ph. D. thesis, Tilburg Univer-
sity, Tilburg, The Netherlands.
Dreef, M., P. Borm, and B. van der Genugten (2003). On strategy and relative
skill in poker. International Game Theory Review , 5, 83–103.
Dreef, M., P. Borm, and B. van der Genugten (2004). A new relative skill
measure for games with chance elements. Managerial and Decision Eco-
nomics , 25, 255–264.
Genugten, B. van der, P. Borm, and M. Dreef (2004). De toepassing van
de wet op de kansspelen op de managementspelen Competitie Manager
en Grand Prix Manager. Report, Department of Econometrics and OR,
Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands. (In Dutch).
Hilbers, P. (2007). Skill in poker. MPhil thesis, Department of Econometrics
and Operations Research, Tilburg University, Tilburg.
Neumann, J. von and O. Morgenstern (1944). Theory of games and economic
behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
22
